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Hope in Concrete Form
The Downpayments on the American Dream Policy Demonstration
Conception, Contributions, Challenges and Consequences
The Downpayments on the American Dream Policy Demonstration (ADD) taught us a lot
about Individual Development Accounts and how low-income families can save and
build assets. More fundamentally and more generally, it taught us a lot about the
American Dream, circa 2000, and how to achieve it.
ADD taught us that the American Dream, the prospect of owning a home, building a
business, pursuing higher education, saving for retirement or of otherwise securing a
brighter economic future, is alive, if latent, among a wide variety of low-income and very
poor families. In fact, the dream is so strong that families will go to great efforts to
achieve it – working, saving, learning and investing – even if that means very real
sacrifice. They save, they work more, they conserve, not because it is easy, but because
it is the price of stability, the price of hope.
ADD taught us how to make the dream real for low income families: provide access,
incentives (in the form of savings matches), information (financial education and account
statements), and support, and even families making less than half the poverty line will
save, build assets and connect to the mainstream economy.
Indeed, ADD proved that saving and asset-building is more a function of structure than it
is of skill or habit. 401(k) savings and asset building accounts work because saving is
made easy – with monthly direct deposit, the accountholder does not have to think about
making deposits. But 401(k) plans do not really provide meaningful access, incentives,
information or support for most low income families who are not employed by firms
offering such retirement accounts, cannot take advantage of tax incentives advantageous
to higher incomes, and often do not even hear of their availability. But now we know
from ADD that given these supports, a wide variety of low income families can and will
take advantage.
There is both an individual and a collective side to the American Dream. On the one
hand, it is an individual dream – the dream that given thought and effort, one can craft a
bright economic future for oneself and one’s family. But there is a collective side to the
dream as well, the fundamental and radical idea that given a realistic opportunity,
common people will forge their own economic futures, and in doing so, will build the
nation’s. When Thomas Jefferson talked of “a nation of small farmers and
shopkeepers,” such was his vision. In the 19th Century, the Homestead Act underscored
this potential; putting land in the hands of millions of resource poor Americans willing to
work it, thereby building a property base under close to a quarter of the population today.
In the 20th Century, the GI Bill renewed it, investing in the college educations, homes and
businesses of returning veterans who in turn drove postwar growth. ADD provides a
framework for extending the dream to the one-third to one-half of the American
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population who is asset poor today and may well feel excluded from the economic
mainstream. And this is perhaps its greatest gift: we now know how to extend the
American Dream to the margins of the society, to include thousands of communities and
millions of families who are left out. Of course, we will have to learn more, especially
about how to offer tens of millions of accounts efficiently and effectively, but we can
undertake this learning knowing that it can be done.
*

*

*

*

Conception:
The Downpayments on the American Dream Policy Demonstration (ADD), the first
large-scale, comprehensively evaluated test of the efficacy of Individual Development
Accounts (IDAs) as a tool for saving and asset-building for low-income working
families.
ADD was conceived in the mid-1990’s, some 4-5 years after Michael Sherraden first
proposed Individual Development Accounts in his seminal book, Assets and the Poor: A
New American Welfare Policy.1 After half a decade’s advocacy, while the idea had
attracted a measure of high level attention and discussion – Jack Kemp, then Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, would carry the book around the country and wave it
at speeches – there was little concrete evidence or action. Five fledgling attempts to
create IDAs appeared across the country, but struggled to implement the idea and
produce even the most minimal data. In Tupelo, Mississippi, the effort closed within a
couple years of inception after generating little take-up. An early effort to create business
and medical IDAs in Montana helped several micro-entrepreneurs buy some business
equipment, but its funding was temporary. The Joyce Foundation funded evaluation
design and advocacy work, and seeded three community efforts which established
prototypical accounts of widely varying construct and struggled to produce any real
effective practice or data. In Indiana, a 9:1 match rate was unlikely to induce any savings
and the lack of withdrawal restrictions ended when one early accountholder bought (and
then promptly lost) a boa constrictor. Legislation had been introduced in Congress as
early as 1991 which contained the outlines of what would later become the Assets for
Independence Act, but it was largely proposed to instigate and focus discussion and was
not headed for any imminent passage. Clearly, something more was needed if the
promise many saw in IDAs was to be realized. It was out of this soil that ADD emerged.
Spurred by rising interest by the Ford and Charles Stewart Mott Foundations and the
continuing interest of Joyce, it occurred that the national demonstration outlined in the
proposed Federal legislation might be developed with private funding, if on a more
modest scale, building on the Joyce-funded initiatives. Indeed, such a private
demonstration might hasten the serious consideration of the Federal legislation. And
ADD was born.

1

Michael Sherraden, Assets and the Poor: A New American Welfare Policy, M.E.
Sharpe, 1991.
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Why a Demonstration?
While interest in IDAs and asset-building antipoverty strategies had been growing at all
levels, before ADD clear limits and barriers to the development of the field had already
emerged, among them:
•

Practice: While community groups can and had launched local
demonstrations, they confronted daunting and often prohibitive challenges in
terms of program design, fundraising, and evaluation. Not only did these
challenges threaten to inhibit the number of community efforts, but also to
undermine their quality and increase the chances of failure (which will be all
the more visible given the paucity of model efforts).

•

Learning: Mechanisms to share lessons among programs were few and weak,
inhibiting the development and spread of best practices.

•

Evaluation: Separate community-level evaluations were unlikely to generate
the hard data necessary to inform significant policy changes.

•

Funding: Few foundations had been funding IDA efforts, and national
funders that had become interested sought national impact and balked at
considering many small proposals.

It became clear that a national multi-site demonstration could overcome these obstacles.
A private sector demonstration could establish a base of best practice lessons, human
stories, political support, public education and an evaluative framework for further
demonstration, policy and practice. Such a demonstration could help focus technical
assistance and evaluation efforts while generating materials and lessons useful to IDA
initiatives outside the demonstration.
The original proposal was explicit in its aims: “ADD is ambitious. But so is its promise:
ADD will test the extent to which poor people can and will save if properly supported,
can utilize their leveraged savings to build businesses, homes and skills, and, in doing so
create jobs, build families, restore hope, and generate profits, taxes, economic and social
development. In addition to facilitating the movement of more than 2,000 low-income
families to economic independence, ADD will become the cornerstone of a new assetbuilding investment policy designed to complement income maintenance policies that has
been the main stay of American antipoverty policy for most of this century. In dollar
terms, we are seeking to make the case for reallocating a decent portion of the $400
billion we spend annually to subsidize the asset accumulation of the non-poor towards
similar investment in the poor.”
The Downpayments on the American Dream Policy Demonstration (ADD) sought to test
the efficacy of Individual Development Accounts as an antipoverty strategy, and thereby
impel and inform larger policy and programmatic initiatives. It did so by helping thirteen
leading community development organizations (and their states) collaboratively develop
Center for Social Development
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better practice in the design and implementation of IDA programs and then rigorously
evaluate the effects of IDAs on low income account holders.
The key objectives of the Demonstration were to:
•

Open at least 2,000 IDAs, honing the tool, and, in doing so, seeking to help
those families move toward economic independence;

•

Develop an effective practice IDA initiatives in thirteen diverse communities
which benefit from access to the best information available about best
practices;

•

Build a field by sharing the lessons of ADD and establishing an inclusive
learning network with other interested public and private innovators;

•

Identify and evaluate the economic and social effects of IDAs, and the
savings, asset-acquisition and economic literacy they entail; and

•

Inform and impel state and Federal policy development.

We believe ADD achieved and for the most part exceeded each of these objectives.
Eight Hypotheses
ADD was designed to test several explicit hypotheses about asset development including:
•

Low income people can and will save if appropriately supported and
encouraged to do so.

•

With IDAs, low income people do indeed start businesses, buy homes and
pursue higher education.

•

Savings and asset development increase economic independence and wellbeing.

•

The accumulation of savings and assets has important effects including gains
in income, self esteem, family stability, initiative taking, economic literacy,
skill development, civic participation.

•

Community groups working with financial institutions can create effective
asset-building programs.

•

Different IDA programs -- different match-rates, program components etc. -have different effects on different communities.

Center for Social Development
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•

IDA programs increase economic literacy, advancing the understanding of and
effective participation in the new economy.

•

An investment in IDAs can generate positive returns for all investors.

ADD contributed important if not always complete evidence for each of these
hypotheses.
During the demonstration, which officially ran from 1997 to 2002, a diverse population
of 2,364 low-income and very poor people opened IDAs through 13 community partners
across the United States.2 Organized and coordinated by the Corporation for Enterprise
Development (CFED), ADD was rigorously studied by the Center for Social
Development (CSD) of Washington University in St. Louis and Abt Associates using
eight different research methods, including implementation assessment, participant case
studies, cross-sectional survey, monitoring, in-depth interviews, cost analysis,
experimental site impact evaluation, and assessment of community effects.3 ADD was
supported by 12 national foundations: the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the Ford
Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Citigroup
Foundation, the F.B. Heron Foundation, the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, the
Fannie Mae Foundation, the Joyce Foundation, the Levi Strauss Foundation, the Met Life
Foundation, the Moriah Fund, and the Rockefeller Foundation.
While the evaluation of ADD continues, much has been learned. Indeed, ADD has
largely established the hypotheses that it began with:
•

Poor people can and will save if offered the right combination of incentives,
access, and institutional supports. The 2,364 ADD accountholders—nearly
half (46%) of whom lived below the poverty line -- who had a median annual
household income of $16,296, saved a total of $1,248,678, or an average of
$19.07 a month, over a span of 2 years. Average and total gross savings were
much higher—$40 per month for a total of $2,530,538 -- as accountholders
deposited an additional $601,660 in accounts even though they knew the
deposits could not be matched, as well as $680,200 in matchable deposits that
they would ultimately withdraw without a match for emergencies or other
urgent needs.
In fact, the poorest 20% of accountholders—those with incomes under half the
poverty line—saved about the same amount as accountholders making over
twice the poverty line; moreover, as a percentage of income the poorest 20%
saved more than three times the rate of those with the highest incomes (2.85%
vs. 0.9% of earned income, respectively). Evaluators deemed a little over half

2

Unless otherwise noted, all data come from the final report on ADD, Saving
Performance in the American Dream Demonstration (Schreiner, Sherraden, & Clancy,
2002).
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of the accountholders (56%, or 1,324) as “savers” in that they had deposited
(and kept) more than $100 in their accounts. The average accountholder made
a deposit in 6 of 12 months.
Low-income people do save—not because it is easy, but because it is the price
of stability and hope. They save by shopping more carefully (70%), eating out
less often (68%), consuming less alcohol and tobacco, spending less on leisure
activities (64%), and working more (29%) (Moore et al., 2001).
The in-depth interviews of a random subsample of the treatment and control
groups at the Tulsa experiment generated significant insights to the nature of
ADD’s saving impacts:4 the interviews found that over 2/3 of accountholders
(69%) articulated long-term and focused savings and investment goals and
engaged in regular savings while only 40% of controls did.5 On the other
hand, controls were twice as likely to mention a plethora of shorter-term and
diffuse savings goals and less likely to know what their savings were.6
•

With IDAs, a wide variety of low-income people do indeed accumulate
assets, buy homes, start businesses, pursue education, and save for
retirement. Matched at rates ranging from 1:1 to 7:1 but averaging just under
2:1 (1.92:1), accountholders accumulated an average of $1,543 each ($2,755
each if only the 1,324 savers were counted), for a total net accumulation of
$3,648,149. As of June 30, 2003, after an average of just over 3 years of
saving, half of all accountholders (90+% of accounts with significant savings)
had purchased an asset. More than 1198 ADD accountholders used matched
withdrawals to finance 479 homes (40% of purchasers), 218 businesses
(18%), 262 stints of postsecondary education or job training (22%), and 126
retirement accounts (11%).
The Abt impact assessment of the Tulsa experiment found highly significant
impacts on home ownership across the entire sample (14% more than the
control group), and especially significant increases in home ownership and
retirement savings for African Americans (treatment effects of more than 40%
in home ownership and $1,081 or 85% more in retirement savings).7

4

Margaret Sherraden, A. McBride, E. Johnson, S. Hanson, F. Ssewamala, T. Shanks,
Saving in Low-Income Households: Evidence from Intereviews with Participants in the
American Dream Demonstration. St. Louis: Center for Social Development, Washington
University George Warren Brown School of Social Work, January 2005.
5
Ibid. pp. 109-111
6
Ibid.
7
Gregory Mills, R. Patterson, L. Orr, and D. DeMarco, Evaluation of the American
Dream Demonstration: Final Evaluation Report. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates.
August 19, 2004. pp. vi-vii.
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•

Low-income people—regardless of race, age, gender, or education;
whether employed, unemployed, or receiving welfare—can and will take
advantage of the asset-building opportunity provided by IDAs. ADD
accountholders included women (80%) and men (20%) from urban and rural
areas, of various races and ethnicities (African American: 47%; Caucasian:
37%; Latino or Hispanic: 9%; Native American: 3%; Asian American or
Pacific Islander: 2%). They ranged in age from 13 to 72 years old (with an
average age at enrollment of 36 years) and represented both married and
unmarried individuals. Most participants had children (76%) and were
employed (78% full- or part-time). Compared with the general low-income
population, ADD accountholders were more likely to have some college
education (61%), be employed (58% full-time, 20% part-time), and have a
bank account (79%).
Neither income, gender, nor previous welfare receipt is a good predictor of
either the likelihood of saving or the level of savings. Education level and age
(up to 40 years) correlate Latinos and Hispanics, Asian Americans, and
Pacific Islanders tended to save a little more than Caucasians, and African
Americans and Native Americans saved less ($5 and $8 less, respectively, in
average monthly net deposits). However, these differentials pale in
comparison with racial asset differentials in society as a whole and group
participation rates in ADD.. On the other hand, assets beget assets: ownership
of a house or car, health coverage, and lack of debt have a significant effect on
savings level and likelihood of being a saver.

•

Saving and asset-building are more than just habits: they are a function
of structure; that is, institutional factors—measured and unmeasured—
have a much greater effect on savings performance than do demographic
characteristics. Higher match rates increase the likelihood of becoming a
saver (though the effect diminishes as match rates increase beyond 3:1) but
not the amount of savings, while higher match caps (targets) increase savings
rates. Direct deposit increased the likelihood of becoming a saver by a
dramatic 22%. Each hour of financial education up to 8 hours increased
average monthly net savings by $1.3, and preliminary data suggest that assetspecific training (e.g., homeownership, entrepreneurship, or educational
counseling) may have similar effects. The variation in average and median
monthly net deposits, accumulation levels, deposit frequencies, savings rates,
and number of unmatched withdrawals by factors of four to ten across the 13
ADD sites suggests the strength of unmeasured institutional factors, even if
we cannot pinpoint the reasons.

•

Assets do “change people’s heads,” increasing the expectations, work,
confidence, and economic engagement of accountholders and their
families. Ninety-three percent of accountholders said they were more
confident of the future, 84% more economically secure, 85% more in control
Center for Social Development
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of their lives, 85% more likely to buy a home, and 57% more likely to start a
business (Moore et al., 2001). For the average accountholder, her IDA is five
times as large as savings in any other liquid bank account and any savings she
had before opening an IDA. A third of accountholders said they actually
worked more and increased their earnings because of IDAs (Moore et al.,
2001). The in-depth interviews across a random subsample of the treatment
and control groups at the Tulsa experimental site clearly demonstrate that
IDAs change the expectations, attitudes, and aspirations of accountholders,
their children, and their relatives and friends.8
ADD was deliberately more than a carefully documented and researched test of IDAs. It
was designed to simultaneously address several goals: to hone IDAs as an effective
savings and asset-building tool, to develop an effective practice and build a broader field,
and to impel supportive state and federal policy development while providing evidence of
effectiveness. Though there is certainly more to do, ADD achieved these objectives too.

8

•

ADD established IDAs as effective savings and asset-building tools. We
now know that match rates between 1:1 and 3:1 seem to provide an effective
asset-building incentive to low-income populations while opening up real
opportunities to accumulate assets over just a few years of saving; higher
match rates are not only more expensive but had no effect on savings level.
Ninety percent of ADD accountholders approved of the match rates, which
averaged about 2:1 (Moore et al., 2001). The ADD’s parallel account
structure—which kept individual savings separate from match funds that were
only paid to the vendor at the time a purchase was approved by the
accountholder and program alike—proved remarkably effective at preventing
fraud and balancing the sense of shared and yet separate ownership. The fact
that ADD community partners were able to accommodate $1.2 million in
oversaving and unmatched withdrawals while ensuring that match funds went
only to approved asset purchases is testimony to the effectiveness of the
account structure. Over 80% of accountholders approved of the withdrawal
restrictions, often commenting that the restrictions helped them save (Moore
et al., 2001). Monthly account statements arrive like diplomas, become a
source of family learning and pride, provide a quantitative measure of
progress, and build confidence and a sense of economic efficacy.

•

ADD established an effective model for IDA delivery: a partnership
between a wide range of community organizations and private financial
institutions offering a few hundred accounts a year along with basic and assetspecific financial training. We know that at least 8 hours of basic financial
education and use of direct deposit have significant impact on savings
outcomes, and we have developed a financial education curriculum based on
the most effective practices of ADD partners and others. We have learned that
such institutional characteristics as match and time caps/goals have significant

Margaret Sherraden, et. al., loc. Cit.
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effects on savings level and likelihood. More than 85% of ADD
accountholders approved of the services provided and the financial education
(though the minority who did not think highly of the financial education was
vocal in their belief that not all poor people—any more than all nonpoor
people—need such education) (Moore et al., 2001). Most ADD programs
provided additional supports—counseling, case management, peer groups, and
more. The management information system for IDAs (MIS-IDA) developed
by CSD as a research, reporting, and recordkeeping tool, proved an
indispensable if somewhat overweight tool for managing IDA programs.
All these achievements come at a price. CSD’s comprehensive assessment
found the costs (including imputed costs for volunteer labor and every
quantifiable contribution) in the large, experimental site were $64 per
participant per month over the first 33 months: $2.20 per dollar saved, or
$1.50 per dollar in assets accumulated (Schreiner, 2002). This is a relatively
high cost, though it dropped 50% after the first year. New ways of reducing
the cost of delivering IDAs are necessary if they are to go to millions rather
than just thousands of accountholders, and some are at hand: more widespread
use of direct deposit (used by only 6% of ADD accountholders); reorganizing
IDA programs by centralizing some functions while decentralizing outreach
and support; streamlining financial education, accounting, and reporting and
moving those responsibilities to institutions with expertise in those areas; and
generally taking advantage of economies of scale in marketing and delivery.
•

ADD built a field comprised, by the end of 2002, of more than 510
community and state IDA partnerships that opened more than 20,000 accounts
in communities across the nation and in all states Almost all of these
independent efforts were informed and encouraged by ADD. From the
beginning and throughout ADD, we shared emerging lessons through four
editions of the IDA Program Design Handbook, five national IDA Learning
Conferences that grew from 300 attendees to 900 (including international
participants), 120 trained VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America)
volunteers, the online IDAnetwork, the quarterly newsletter Assets, a bestpractices financial education curriculum Finding Paths to Prosperity, and a
training institute, all of which were catalyzed by and grew out of ADD.

•

ADD impelled state and federal policy. Throughout ADD, the lessons of
community practice and the guidance and advocacy of practitioners and
accountholders were used to inform and impel state and federal policy. ADD
partners and the emerging field drove a reduction in asset penalties in existing
benefit programs and the creation of IDA programs at the state level in 41
states. The lessons, local and state demand, advocacy and coordination
provided by ADD led directly to the passage of the 5-year, $125-million,
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50,000-account Assets for Independence Act (AFIA) authorization.9 Not only
has AFIA become the major source of funding in the field, but it has, in turn,
fostered the development of complementary federal policy changes, including
the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s multimillion-dollar IDA initiative,
positive tax treatment from the Internal Revenue Service, and supportive
Community Reinvestment Act policies from federal regulators. All of these
steps have led us to the verge of much larger-scale IDA policy, notably, the
federal Savings for Working Families Act (SWFA), which would support
hundreds of thousands of IDAs and lay the groundwork for millions more
through a tax credit to financial institutions to match the first $500 in annual
savings. SWFA commands support from the leadership in both parties in both
houses of Congress and the Bush Administration and has opened the door to a
large, truly inclusive, progressive, enduring, and participant-centered savings
and asset-building system.
It should be noted that the five distinct faces of ADD – people, programs, field, research
and policy – interacted and strengthened one another. The accountholders and programs
of ADD were inspired by a policy/system idea; in turn, the accountholders and programs
bumped up against and challenged current asset limits and penalties and impelled the
development of the field and the passage of the Assets for Independence Act. Research
results animated policy discussions in the US, Canada and the United Kingdom,
contributing to multi-billion dollar proposals in the US, and large scale childrens account
initiatives in Canada and the UK. Practice, policy and research are rarely in sync. The
legislative proposal that finally became AFIA inspired ADD, but, by the time AFIA
passed, ADD practice had moved ahead of AFIA, with more functional account designs,
MIS systems and program models. So too the development of the field began to point
beyond the current community partnership delivery model to much larger scale systems.
Challenges:
ADD exceeded all its objectives. But, just as clearly, the ambitious initiative had its
limits, failings, and challenges. In many ways, it could only be a beginning. At least ten
challenges deserve consideration:
1. Time:
ADD was necessarily of limited duration. What Michael
Sherraden had proposed as lifetime accounts had been changed into a 3-5 year
intervention. Surprisingly, IDAs worked pretty well in this foreshortened
version, but just as certainly, some accountholders who might have become
actively involved in their accounts later or accumulated a more adequate nest
egg, never got the chance. On the other hand, the shorter time frame may well
have forced earlier attention and action. In any case, most community
programs and legislation would adopt IDAs as temporary interventions.

9

Of the full authorization, $95 million was actually appropriated during the first five
years of AFIA, with somewhat over 30,000 accounts actually incented.
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Moreover, we have yet to be able to see the longer-term effects of IDAs
beyond the first 2 years—the ultimate use of the accounts; the way assets
grow once invested in homes, businesses, and education; or the enduring
effects of IDAs after matching ceases. Nor do we know what the long-term
effect would be of accounts that were not artificially constrained by the time
limits of a necessarily temporary demonstration effort.
2. Limits of the Impact Assessment: The experimental impact assessment of
IDAs at the large site at the Community Action Project of Tulsa County may
well have been the first experimental test of savings behavior in the U.S.
Perhaps it should not come as any surprise that it would have shortcomings.
The costs of the experiment were significant; not only was the dollar cost high
– more than all the other evaluation components combined – but the burdens
of staging the experiment were severe and the ethical costs were significant.
In order to keep the control group pure, controls were actually denied housing
downpayment assistance to which they would otherwise have been able to
access. Indeed, it should be noted that the research which drove policy and
field building to date was entirely from non-impact findings.
The impact assessment of ADD conducted by Abt Associates demonstrates
beyond a reasonable doubt that IDAs produced significant differences in home
ownership (+14%), especially among African-Americans, whose
homeownership was 41% than the control group and whose retirement savings
were 85% higher than the control group.10
But what is, at least on first view, most surprising is the fact that the impact
assessment found no significant difference in savings, asset-building (other
that that noted), business ownership, start-up or preparation etc. We believe
that if the tree falling in the forest made no sound, it was not because trees
failed to fall, but that the study’s couldn’t hear them. Abt notes in its final
report that due to the size of the sample, inherent variability of the outcome
measures and data quality, the minimum detectable effects (MDE’s) of this
study were so large that they exceeded “the plausible range of impacts for the
intervention.”11 Among the outcomes where the MDE exceeded the plausible
range of impacts by more than 25% of the control mean were home purchase,
business ownership, business start-up or purchase, activities preparatory to
business start-up, liquid assets, and retirement savings.12 The threshold for
detecting any significant change in total, net and other financial assets was
even larger – more than 50% of mean – which Abt notes is “implausibly
10

Gregory Mills, Rhiannon Patterson, Larry Orr and Donna, DeMarco, Evaluation of the
American Dream Demonstration: Final Evaluation Report. Cambridge, MA: Abt
Associates, August 19, 2004. pp. 37, 46, 51
11
Op. cit., p 62.
12
Ibid.
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large.”13 Consider that for the impact study to have registered significant
differences in total financial assets, the treatment group would have to have
averaged gains in excess of $4,697; differences in real assets of $8,827, in
total assets of $10,666, and net worth of more than $8,531.14 Significantly,
the in-depth interviews, conducted on a random sub-sample of both treatments
and controls, demonstrates huge differences between the treatment and control
groups in terms of savings, long-term orientation, and other attitudinal and
behavioral variables.
The Abt impact evaluation of the CAPTC IDA experiment proved IDAs work
within its range of acuity, but is probably best regarded as a promising
beginning. Other impact assessments of random experiments like those going
on in Canada will have to fill in the picture.
3. Costs and Benefits: ADD produced a comprehensive assessment of the costs
of running the CAPTC IDA program.15 Even after attempting to control for
random assignment, start-up, research, and demonstration burdens, the $61
per participant-month cost was higher than expected.16 IDA program costs –
even with the match – are lower than other relatively intensive interventions
like HeadStart, public service employment and training. Still, costs are hard
to judge without a comparably comprehensive assessment of benefits. The
benefits of IDAs were qualified if not quantified in ADD, and include savings,
savings behavior, future orientation, financial intelligence, asset-appreciation,
business preparation, formation and growth, postsecondary education and
skills, home ownership, etc. But assessing the monetary value of these and
other benefits is necessarily difficult, since the outcomes are often long term,
hard to quantify and still hard to project. Until cost-benefit or return on
investment studies can be done, we must deal with the fact that no study has
shown IDA programs as configured under ADD are not cost-effective or even
quite productive.
4. Scale, Policy and Financial Systems: The cost figures on IDA programs did
cause some observers to suggest that IDA programs as configured in ADD
were “un-scalable” -- that is, they were too expensive (and perhaps too labor
intensive and local) to deliver millions of accounts. Indeed, the ADD
effective practice model involves a community-based organization- financial
institution partnership which opens a few hundred accounts at any one time.
Clearly, it is hard to imagine how a delivery system consisting of programs so
structured – even if they were to multiply in number, efficiency and
13

Ibid.
Loc. Cit., p. D-3
15
Schreiner, M. (2004) Program Costs for Individual Development Accounts: Final
Figures from CAPTC in Tulsa. St. Louis: Washington University, Center for Social
Development.
16
Schreiner, M. op. cit.
14
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effectiveness – could build from the current base of 500 programs and 20,000
accounts, to more than tens or hundreds of thousands. As we have been able
to think about the performance of ADD partner programs, of the field ADD
spawned, and the performance of third generation IDA programs restructured
to serve thousands of accountholders rather than just hundreds, it seems to be
becoming clear that: 1) scale is more than one thing, and the current level of
performance with tens of thousands of accounts is significant; but 2.) larger
scale performance will require breakthroughs in public policy (real incentives
for hundreds of thousands and millions of low-income people) and 3.) a
profitable, efficient financial product which can be profitably delivered by the
hundreds of thousands or millions by private financial institutions. Such a
system will necessarily be streamlined, and may well need more intensive
local or state programs to reach as or more deeply and effectively into
disadvantaged communities as ADD programs were.
5. Take-up Rate: ADD accountholders were the products of both self-selection
and program selection. We do not know from ADD what the take-up rate of
IDAs would be from the full population of asset and income poor households,
let alone among moderate income households. ADD results would suggest
that universal enrollment will not come effortlessly, and will require changing
the institutional and cultural environment, strong validators, financial
education and legitimacy, and as much automatic inclusion techniques as
possible.
6. The Deteriorating Base for Economic Progress: The ability of low-income
working families to take advantage of the asset-building opportunity offered
by IDA programs is significantly affected by the economic and social
conditions confronting low income people trying to get ahead. Specifically –
as came out in the in depth interviews – the decline in job and income
opportunities ( and the rise in low wage, low benefit, temporary employment),
medical coverage, crime, housing stock, etc., all make it difficult to save,
learn, work and invest. As the report on the in-depth interviews commented:
“Lack of adequate health insurance, low incomes, insecure employment, lowquality schools, an dangerous neighborhoods contributed to the difficulties
that families had in accumulating significant IDA savings. These structural
problems beg for policy solutions.”17
If IDA and asset-building opportunities are to be effective, these starting
conditions will need to improve. Indeed, it is unbelievable that against this
baseline of declining economic opportunity, low income working families
have been able to advance on the heels of IDAs at all. Universal health
insurance, making work pay, altering the mass messages to consume, borrow
and use credit, and the like will need to be improved and the safety net will
need to remain in place as asset, earning and entrepreneurship penalties are
removed.
7. Other types of Asset-building Accounts and Products: Children’s accounts,
employer- or job-based accounts, as well as unbundled account products
17
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(separate first accounts, tax-and EITC related facilitation, basic and assetspecific financial education, asset-leveraging etc.) were inspired by ADD, but
not demonstrated by it.
8. Communications: The communications efforts which accompanied ADD
were modest compared to the volume of activity, the depth and breadth of data
and lessons, the quality of the accountholder stories, and the extent of the
policy and financial implications of ADD. It is not too late to communicate
the story and lessons of ADD, and the academic literature continues to grow,
but more deserves to be done.
9. Philanthropic Downturn: Just as ADD began winding down, the stock market
turned and philanthropic endowments and giving declined. This meant that
some ADD funders pulled out before completion. It also meant that there was
no funding to continue or make enduring the field support provided under
ADD at just the time when the scope of the asset-building field was
expanding, new entrants to the field were maturing and existing actors were
beginning to feel the competition for resources. The generosity and
connection of the field, which had always accelerated its development and
maturation, was thus undermined.
Consequences: Hope in Concrete Form
The community organizations and financial partners who took part in ADD pioneered the
field and made it possible for thousands of low-income people to save and build assets.
Thanks to the ADD project and its partners, we know that IDAs can work, and, more
broadly, that given the right incentives, access, information and supports, low-income
and even very poor people can save, build assets and increase economically activity. Now
is the time to use what’s been learned to benefit hundreds of thousands, possibly even
millions, of people. To do so, we need to develop larger-scale and more efficient delivery
systems that add value for all individual and institutional participants, and we need to
build large-scale public support. We need to move from field to market, from community
tool to universal, inclusive, and enduring system. We are not there, but we are much
closer because of ADD.
Whatever happens, ADD has provided good evidence that poor, low-income, and even
moderate-income people should not be excluded from savings and asset-building
policies, existing and new, and deserve at least equivalent incentives.
“Assets,” in Michael Sherraden’s memorable phrase, “are hope in concrete form.” In a
very real sense, ADD too is best characterized as hope in concrete form. In the stories of
accountholders, the records of community programs, the layers of state and federal
policy, the evolving financial institution products and systems, the growing
understanding of the dynamics and causes of saving and asset-building and the reams of
evidence produced by ADD are the outlines, rationale, and means of a truly inclusive
savings and asset-building system in the United States (and beyond). If the original
ambitions of ADD have not all been realized yet, ADD provides a strong and vibrant
foundation on which to build. This is altogether due to the extraordinary people involved
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in ADD – accountholders and their families, foremost, but also creative and effective
community practitioners, willing financial institutions, committed and thoughtful
researchers, responsive policymakers, risk-taking, thoughtful, patient and generous
funders – partners all, who made ADD possible.
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